In one way or another, the law was guided by the biological conditions of conception, pregnancy and birth. The legal mother was the woman who gave birth to the child, the legal father was the man who fathered the child. First and foremost, biological parentage -with regard to the father at least a presumed one -also led to legal parenthood.
In recent decades, however, advances in modern reproductive medicine have multiplied the number of possible responses to the question of legal parentage, thus leading to the need to regulate what has seemed self-evident so far. It is not surprising that the solutions that were found by different legal systems for such a delicate issue as human reproduction diverge not only globally, but also within Europe. An international consensus on this topic seems hardly conceivable.
II
These differences can be illustrated by the different approaches of the German and the Russian law towards surrogacy. The term surrogacy denotes circumstances in which a woman -the surrogate mother -is subjected to an artificial fertilisation at the request of other persons -the intended parents -in order to hand over the child after its birth to the intended parents, who intend to raise it as their own.
1
Under German law this artificial fertilisation as well as the mediation of a surrogate mother is a criminal offense.
1 In this way surrogacy and the legal and ethical conflicts, that accompany it, are supposed to be avoided from the outset.
According to German law, therefore, the legal mother is always the woman who gave birth to the child. As it turned out, the child was genetically not related to the intended parents. For the artificial fertilisation in Russia instead of the sperms of the intended father those of an unknown donor had -probably inadvertently -been used. were not able to represent the child.
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The Court concluded however that the intended parents' right to respect for their family life under Article 8 of the Convention was violated. As they provided for the child for a period of at least half a year, there "existed a de facto family life" between the intended parents and the child protected by the Convention. 22 The
Italian State had not exceeded the limits of its discretion by refusing to recognize the intended parents' legal parenthood of the child. 23 Here it was free to take into account the fact that there was no genetic link between the intended parents and the child.
However, the Italian State should not have removed the child from the intended parents.
According to the Court, the removal of the child violated the interests of the child which are ultimately decisive. 24 
25
A state that generally rejects surrogacy may accomplish this in different ways. It can recognize foreign judgments which provide for a legal descent from the intended parents as is the case in Germany. 26 It may establish the legal descent by applying the law of the respective foreign country which, like Russia, provides for a regulation of surrogacy. 27 And if the state only applies its own law that rejects surrogacy, it may allow the intended parents to adopt the child.
28
In effect, the factual situation induced by 
